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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES: 
PROCEDURAL EFFECTS UNDER MARYLAND LAW 
IN STATE AND FEDERAL FORUMS 
The author surveys the effects of presumptions in civil cases and 
examines the Maryland decisions on the subject. Observing the 
divergence between the "bursting bubble" theory of presump-
tions embodied in Rule 301 of the new Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the tendency in Maryland to accord presumptions 
a greater procedural significance, the author scrutinizes the 
federal-state choice of law question under Federal Rule 302. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is doubtful that any subject within the law of evidence has 
prompted more commentary, provoked more argument, or engendered 
more controversy than the subject of presumptions. 1 A primary source 
of confusion has been semantics-what a presumption is definitionally, 
what is included within the term, and what effect a presumption has 
when it appears in a case. As reporter for the Model Code of Evidence, 
Professor Morgan commented: 
It would be easy to demonstrate that the law as to 
presumptions is even more in need of simplication than that 
relating to hearsay. The confusion in the cases is due in part to 
the use of inaccurate terminology and the consequent misappli-
cation of precedents, in part to faulty analysis and careless 
presentation by counsel, and in part to the generally accepted 
assumption that all presumptions are to be given the same 
procedural effect.2 
The problem is compounded by the enormous number of presump-
tions, the fact that presumptions are created, or are recognized, for 
different reasons, 3 and the fact that presumptions appear in a limitless 
variety of contexts.4 
1. See C. McCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 345, at 826 (2d 
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 
391 (1956); Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952). 
2. Morgan, Forward, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 52 (1942), quoted in Gausewitz, 
Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 V AND. L. REV. 324 (1952). Although written 
thirty·four years ago, these words are no less accurate today. 
3. Professor Morgan lists seven reasons for the creation of presumptions: 
1. To make unnecessary the introduction of evidence upon an issue made by 
the pleadings but not likely to be the subject of serious dispute .... 
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The Maryland decisions involving the application of presumptions in 
civil cases demonstrate several points valuable to a preliminary 
perspective. First, Maryland may be said to fall within a general rule 
that there is little variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to which 
presumptions are recognized, and virtually no variation with respect to 
the more frequently-occurring presumptions, whether acknowledged by 
decision or statute.5 Second, as a single jurisdiction, Maryland is not 
vulnerable to Professor Morgan's criticism. Maryland has never dog-
matically embraced a one-rule approach on the effect of presumptions. 
Rather, the Maryland courts appear to have appreciated the complexity 
of the problem in following a case-by-case or presumption-by-
presumption approach. This cauti6n has avoided conflict in the cases 
but has resulted in a relative state of underdevelopment. Finally, as one 
of many, however, Maryland has contributed to the discord among the 
jurisdictions in the treatment of presumptions, for a line of Maryland 
cases has woven a thread of dissent in the fabric of traditional 
presumption law. 
As a result of the Erie doctrine,6 applicability in federal forums has 
become an important aspect of state presumption law. Among the 
recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence 7 are two rules concerning 
presumptions in civil cases.s Rule 301 prescribes the effect to be given 
presumptions in cases governed by federal law.9 Rule 302 prescribes 
2. To avoid a procedural impasse in a situation where evidence as to the 
presumed fact is lacking .... 
3. To avoid such an impasse created by the impossibility of securing legally 
competent evidence of the presumed fact .... 
4. To produce a result in accord with the preponderance of probability, 
"common experience shows the facts to be so generally true that courts may notice 
the truth." ... 
5. To require the party having peculiar means of access to the facts and 
evidence of the facts to make them known to the court .... 
6. To reach a result deemed socially desirable wherever the basic fact 
exists .... 
7. To reach a result deemed desirable for a combination of two or more of the 
foregoing reasons .... E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 32·33 (1963). 
4. As a consequence of these difficulties, those who would comment upon the law of 
presumptions, as distinguished from comment upon a single presumption, must reckon 
with this dilemma: it is at once meaningless to discuss the subject without reference to 
particular presumptions and practically impossible to do so with reference to all 
presumptions. A compromise is commanded: although generality necessitates exemplifica-
tion, when distinctions are called for, they will be made. 
5. The rule, however, is not without exception. For example, the Maryland legislature has 
abolished the common law presumption of death from proof of unexplained absence for 
seven years or more. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-102 (1974). 
6. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
7. Fed. Rules Evid., 28 V.S.C.A. (1975). 
8. Although the Supreme Court promulgated a rule dealing with presumptions in criminal 
cases, the Congress deleted this rule. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973). 
9. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 301, 28 V.S.C.A. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rule 301]: 
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of 
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the 
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of 
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when state law controls the effect of presumptions in federal courts. 10 
In federal court cases in which the potentially applicable state law has 
followed the traditional view on the effect of presumptions embodied 
in Rule 301, the choice of law is without significance. The Maryland 
cases, however, reflect a trend toward according presumptions a greater 
procedural effect than Rule 301. As a result, insofar as Maryland is 
concerned, the choice between state law and federal law, and thus the 
scope of Rule 302, may assume dispositive significance. 
PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 
The only statement which can be made about presumptions without 
contradiction or exception is that a rebuttable presumption of lawll is 
an evidentiary rule of law which compels the finding of a particular fact 
(the presumed fact) upon proof of a basic fact or set of facts,t2 in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary Y Beyond this, reference must be 
made to th~ theoretical notions behind presumptions and to their 
operation, or treatment, in practice. 
Every presumption recognized is founded upon one or both of two 
general values. A presumption may exist because of the inferential 
probative value of a standardized, basic set of facts. The most 
frequently occurring example of this type of presumption is the 
presumption of receipt arising from proof of proper mailing: "[T] esti-
mony of a witness that he properly addressed, stamped and mailed a 
letter raises a presumption that it reached its destination at the regular 
time and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. "14 The 
inference of receipt is supported or bolstered by the regularity and 
reliability of the nation's mail service. IS Some presumptions, on the 
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on 
whom it was originally cast. 
10. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 302,28 U.S.C.A. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rule 302]: 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a 
fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law. 
11. The term "presumption of fact" is often used to describe the rational inference which 
may arise from a particular fact or set of facts. If a rule of law respecting the allocation 
of the burden of proof attaches to the basic fact or facts, it is a presumption of law. If 
not, it is not a presumption at all. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491, at 288·89 (3d ed. 
1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391, 
392 (1956). Whether or not "conclusive presumptions," often called "presumptions of 
law," should be embraced by the term, id. at 391, they are not dealt with here, for they 
are rules of substantive law, not of evidence. See United Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. 
Prostic, 169 Md. 535, 540, 182 A. 421, 423 (1936). 
12. It is commonly said that a presumption arises upon proof of the underlying facts which 
give rise inferentially to the presumed fact. MCCORMICK 820; WIGMORE § 2490 at 288. 
This, of course, assumes that all presumptions are founded upon a basic fact or set of 
facts which are circumstantially probative of the fact to be presumed. However, all 
presumptions are not of this sort, and some appear to arise without proof of any basic 
fact or facts. See p. 303·05 infra. 
13. MCCORMICK 820; WIGMORE § 2491, at 289. 
14. Kolker v. Biggs, 203 Md. 137, 144,99 A.2d 743, 746 (1953). 
15. Id., 99 A.2d at 747. 
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other hand, arise upon proof of the basic facts, not as a consequence of 
their probative value, but because of public policy. In many jurisdic-
tions, when it is shown that a person has not been heard from by his 
relatives for seven years or more, despite efforts to locate him, in the 
absence of an explanation of the disappearance, there is a presumption 
that the person is dead. 16 "The presumption is arbitrary, connected 
with neither reason nor logic but founded upon a public policy that 
important social and property rights shall not remain indefinitely in 
abeyance because of the impossibility of proving by real evidence the 
life or death of such person upon whose life such rights depend." 17 
Other presumptions which are primarily grounded in public policy are 
underpinned by a basic fact or set of facts which, at least as a matter of 
statistical probability, indicates the existence of the fact which public 
policy demands be presumed. By statute in Maryland, "[a] child born 
or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of 
both spouses,,,18 and "a child born at any time after his parents have 
participated in a marriage ceremony with each other, even if the 
marriage is invalid, is presumed to be the legitimate child of both 
parents. ,,19 Similarly, in actions for personal injuries caused by an 
automobile not driven by the owner, proof of ownership of the vehicle 
raises a presumption that the driver was a servant of the owner acting 
within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.20 This 
presumption is supported, in policy, by the assumed superior access of 
the owner to information concerning the operation of his car and by a 
preference that a vehicle owner should shoulder broader responsibility 
for harm caused by his instrumentality.21 
There are presumptions which appear to arise without proof of any 
underlying facts. For example, "the law presumes that every person is 
sane and possesses the requisite mental capacity to execute [a legal 
instrument] ."22 The cases do not indicate that the person who would 
16. E.g., Borzage v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 6 Conn. Cir. 269, 270 A.2d 688 (1970). 
Although once recognized in Maryland, Robb v. Horsey, 169 Md. 227, 234·36, 181 A. 
348, 351·52 (1935), this common law presumption has been abolished by statute. MD. 
ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3·102 (1974). 
17. Robb v. Horsey, 169 Md. 227, 235, 181 A. 348, 351 (1935). The Maryland Court of 
Appeals made this observation before the legislative abolition of the presumption. 
18. MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., § 1·206(a) (1974). 
19. [d. Both presumptions are made rebuttable by MD. ANN. CODE, Est. & Tr. Art., 
§ 1.105(b) (1974). 
20. E.g., Grier v. Rosenberg, 213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957). In Martin Furniture Corp. 
v. Yost, 247 Md. 42,49·50,230 A.2d 338,342 (1967), the court of appeals pointed out 
that this situation really involves two presumptions-a presumption of agency on 
behalf of the owner and a presumption that the agent was acting within the scope of his 
employment. Thus the presumption regarding the scope of employment operated against 
an admitted principal who had leased but did not own the car. [d. at 51, 230 A.2d at 
343. 
21. McCORMICK 822. This presumption may, as well, rest on the inferential value of the fact 
of ownership. See note 82 & p. 314 infra. 
22. Gordon v. Rawles, 201 Md. 503, 512, 94 A.2d 465, 469·70 (1953). 
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rely upon the presumption need make any showing to raise it.23 In 
personal injury cases, there is a presumption that a deceased or 
incapacitated person was in the exercise of due care at the time of the 
accident.24 Unless death or incapacity be regarded as the triggering 
fact, this presumption also arises without proof of a prerequisite 
foundation. 
As stated above, it is universally held that a presumption requires the 
trier of fact to find the existence of the presumed fact in the absence of 
contradictory evidence.25 The confusion and discrepancies in the 
treatment of presumptions by different courts appear when contrary 
evidence is adduced by the party against whom the presumption 
operates.26 Since the time of Professor Thayer's springboard work on 
the law of evidence,27 and particularly since Wigmore promoted the 
doctrine28 attributed to Thayer,29 the law of presumptions has been 
thoroughly dominated by the "Thayer" or "bursting bubble" theory. 30 
Under the doctrine, a presumption operates in favor of a party who has 
the burden of proof31 by shifting to the other party the duty of going 
forward with the evidence on the issue. 32 In effect, this means that the 
party relying on the presumption can get past a motion for a directed 
verdict made at the close of his case without any direct proof of the 
presumed fact, and may succeed with respect to that issue if the other 
party does not come forward with evidence. 33 In its pure form, this is 
all that a bursting bubble presumption does. Once the other party 
produces evidence on the issue34 sufficient to support a finding 
contrary to the presumed fact, the bubble is burst and the presumption 
23. See, e.g., Masius v. Wilson, 213 Md. 259, 131 A.2d 484 (1957); Gordon v. Rawles, 201 
Md. 503, 94 A.2d 465 (1953). 
24. E.g., Gresham v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 256 Md. 500, 260 A.2d 649 (1970); 
Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185,249 A.2d 252 (1969). 
25. P. 303 supra. 
26. See MCCORMICK 820. 
27. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898). 
28. WIGMORE §§ 2490·91. 
29. Dean Gausewitz examined in depth Thayer's words on presumptions and concluded that 
Thayer did not intend that there should be a single rule for all presumptions, namely, the 
bursting bubble rule. Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REv. 391,406·08 (1956). 
30. MCCORMICK 821. 
31. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324,339 (1952). In 
dealing with presumptions, it is especially important to distinguish the two aspects of 
burden of proof: the burden of persuasion, or risk of nonpersuasion, and the burden or 
duty of going forward with the evidence. See 10 M.L.E., Evidence § 21, at 101 (1961). 
32. MCCORMICK 821; WIGMORE § 2491, at 288. 
33. MCCORMICK 820 & n. 33. 
34. In the case of a presumption which arises upon proof of basic facts, the party against 
whom the presumption operates may attack the presumption by contrary evidence going 
to the existence of the basic facts as well as evidence going to the existence of the fact to 
be presumed. In such a case, the judge should instruct the jury that if they find in favor 
of the basic facts, they must find in favor of the presumed fact. McCORMICK 820. A 
Maryland case exposing this distinction is Border v. Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 297 A.2d 81 
(1972), involving the presumption of receipt of mailed matter from proof of proper 
stamping, addressing and mailing. 
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no longer exists in the case.35 Accordingly, there is a corollary 
proscription against mentioning the presumption or rule of law to the 
jury.36 
The courts of practically every jurisdiction have, at one time or 
another, proclaimed adherence to the bursting bubble theory. 37 
Nevertheless, courts have frequently departed from the dogma, on a 
"presumption by presumption basis. ,,38 According to Morgan, the 
cases reflect seven patterns of departure from or variation of the Thayer 
theory "as to the condition which must be fulfilled to prevent or 
modify or destroy the effect which the establishment of the basic fact 
would have if it stood alone:,,39 .(1) if evidence has been presented 
which is sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the 
presumed fact, the presumption has effect only if the trier of fact 
discredits that evidence; (2) if there is such evidence, the presumption 
lasts until the trier credits the evidence; (3) the presumption is taken 
out of the case altogether by substantial evidence to the contrary; 
(4) the presumption prevails unless the trier is persuaded that the 
nonexistence of the presumed fact is as likely as its existence; (5) once 
the basic facts are established, the risk of nonpersuasion as to the 
presumed fact moves to the other party; (6) in the case of a 
presumption founded upon the opponent's knowledge or access to 
information concerning the presumed fact, the risk of nonpersuasion as 
to the basic facts, but not as to the presumed fact, is shifted; (7) the 
presumption is to be treated as evidence.4o 
Emphasizing that a presumption may manifest itself at trial on 
motions for a directed verdict and in jury instructions,41 McCormick 
dealt more specifically with the matter of possible deviations from the 
Thayerian rule against mentioning the presumption to the jury. The 
alternatives considered by him include instructing the jury that the 
35. MCCORMICK 821; WIGMORE § 2491, at 289. Even though the presumption disappears as a 
rule of law, in a case involving a presumption founded upon the probative value of the 
basic facts, the inference alone may be relied upon. MCCORMICK 821. See Border v. 
Grooms, 267 Md. 100, 104, 297 A.2d 81, 83 (1972), but notice the confusion of 
terminology. 
One judge colorfully termed presumptions under the Thayer theory "bats of the 
law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts." Mockowik 
v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R.R. Co., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (1906) 
(Lamm, J.), quoted in MCCORMICK 821 and WIGMORE § 2491, at 291 n. 6. 
36. MCCORMICK 821; WIGMORE § 2491, at 290; Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 ARK. L. REV. 401, 405 (1971). 
37. See cases and quotations collected at 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491, at 290 n. 6 (Supp. 
1975). Maryland is exceptional. See p. 311-12 infra. 
38. MCCORMICK 826. As a matter of precedent, McCormick's characterization is certainly 
accurate, for in giving effect to a particular presumption which is in issue, a court does 
not prescribe the rule for any other presumption. McCormick's overall perception of 
presumption law, however, was more a catalogue of exceptions to the traditional rule 
than a catalogue of individual rules. [d. at 822. 
39. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 34 (1963). 
40. [d. at 34-37. 
41. MCCORMICK 819. 
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basic facts, if established, raise a presumption in favor of the presumed 
fact; that the presumption is evidence to be weighed with all of the 
other evidence admitted; that the presumed fact is to be taken as true 
unless the jury finds the evidence as to the existence or nonexistence of 
the presumed fact to be of equal weight, in which case the issue should 
be resolved against the party with the burden of persuasion; in a case 
in which the basic facts are circumstantially probative of the presumed 
fact, that where such basic facts exist, it is probable that the presumed 
fact is true.42 In discussing the problems involved with each approach, 
McCormick saw difficulty in choosing words which would strike an 
appropriate balance between implying too much and conveying too 
little.43 He saw the "best solution" as simply instructing the jury that 
it must find the presumed fact unless the party against whom the 
presumption operates establishes its nonexistence by a preponderance 
of the evidence.44 
McCormick's "solution" was a product of his conviction that a 
presumption should fix the burden of persuasion on the party against 
whom it was directed, and complemented his contribution to the 
academic tug-of-war on whether or not there should be a single rule for 
all presumptions, and if so, what that rule should be.45 To Professors 
Bohlen46 and Morgan,47 the most sensible approach would be to assign 
each presumption a procedural effect consonant with the policy behind 
it. Dean Gausewitz agreed, believing that this approach called for a 
different rule for different groups of presumptions.48 Because of the 
practical difficulties in administering a number of different rules, 
however, Morgan49 and GausewitzSO ultimately concluded that there 
should be one rule governing the effect of presumptions, and concurred 
with McCormick51 that a presumption should shift the burden of 
persuasion on the issue. McCormick deemed the primary objection to 
such a rule as being the frequently stated dogma that the burden of 
proof is unalterably assigned at the commencement of the trial. 52 But 
the policies which underlie the allocation of the burden of persuasion 53 
might be outweighed by those which give rise to presumptions, and, in 
42. [d. at 825·26 & no. 59·67. 
43. [d. See also Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules, 24 ARK. L. REV. 401, 
407 (1971). 
44. McCORMICK 826. 
45. See Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324 (1952); p. 306 
& note 38 supra. 
46. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. 
PA. L. REV. 307, 313 (1920). 
47. See Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255,281 (1937). 
48. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324,330 (1952). 
49. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO.AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGA. 
TION 81 (1956). 
50. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One·Rule World, 5 VAND. L. REV. 324, 340·41 (1952). 
51. McCORMICK 826. 
52. MCCORMICK 826·27. See Fisher v. Baltimore Transit Co., 184 Md. 399, 401, 41 A.2d 
297,298 (1945). 
53. See note 100 infra. 
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any event, the bursting bubble theory is simply inadequate to 
implement presumption policy. 54 Four by-products reflect this "Battle 
of Presumptions.,,55 The 1942 Model Code of Evidence propounded a 
strict bursting bubble rule.56 Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence 
proposed eleven years later, a presumption founded upon circumstan-
tially probative basic facts shifts the burden of persuasion, otherwise a 
presumption has a Thayerian effect only.57 The 1965 California 
Evidence Code reversed the formula of the Uniform Rules58 shifting 
the burden of persuasion only with respect to presumptions founded on 
public policy and the new Federal Rules of Evidence returned to a 
straight bursting bubble theory in cases governed by federallaw.59 
PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES IN MARYLAND 
In any given jurisdiction, presumptions have been the subject of far 
more dicta than rationes decidendi. As McCormick noted,60 in order 
for an aspect of presumption law to be the ground for decision, the case 
must turn on trial rulings, on motions for directed verdicts or on 
instructions. With this caveat in mind, attention will now be focused on 
the treatment of presumptions in Maryland. 
The most significant case on the Maryland presumption landscape is 
Grier u. Rosenberg,61 in which the court of appeals reversed a 
judgment against a personal injury plaintiff upon a jury verdict for the 
defendant car owner, and ordered a new trial because the trial court 
refused to instruct the jury that "if the jury found as a fact ownership 
of the car in [defendant Rosenberg], there arose a rebuttable 
presumption that the automobile was being operated by [Rosenberg] 
or by his agent, servant and/or employee acting within the scope of the 
agent's, servant's and/or employee's employment.,,62 The state of the 
evidence is crucial to an understanding of the significance of any case in 
the field of presumptions, which so intimately involves burdens of 
proof. 
54. See McCORMICK 822, 826·27; Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391, 404 
(1956). As Morgan stated: 
Just as the courts have come to recognize that there is no a priori formula for 
fixing the burden of persuasion, so they should recognize that if there is a good 
reason for putting on one party or the other the burden of going forward with 
evidence ... it ought to be good enough to control a finding when the mind of 
the trier is in equilibrium. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE 
ANGLO· AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 81 (1956). 
55. Wyckoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 173 Ore. 592, 595, 147 P.2d 227,229 
(1944). 
56. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 704 (1942). 
57. UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 14(a)-(b). 
58. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 603-06 (West 1966). 
59. Rule 301. 
60. P. 306 & note 41 supra. 
61. 213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737 (1957). 
62. [d. at 252, 131 A.2d at 738-39. 
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Grier had alleged personal injury caused to her by the sudden stop of 
a Baltimore City bus on which she was a passenger. 63 The testimony 
tended to show that the bus had to stop quickly to avoid a collision 
with an automobile owned by Rosenberg which darted into the path of 
the bus and then left the scene. The court of appeals synopsized 
Rosenberg's rebuttal: 
His only evidence relative thereto was his own testimony, which 
was to the effect that he knew nothing of the injury complained 
of until nearly six months after its occurrance; that he did not 
know or recall any activity, on the day in question, that would 
have involved his presence at the scene of the alleged injury; 
that there was a possibility that his car might have been there 
and some one from his office could have been driving it; that he 
had been treated at the Sinai Hospital, about six blocks from 
the scene, and still makes visits there for medical care; and that 
he had inquired among his employees and none of them recalled 
any occasion for driving his car on the day in question, or at 
that time being in the vicinity where the plaintiff received her 
injury. 64 
Grier contended that this state of the evidence entitled her to the 
instruction denied. Rosenberg responded that the subject presumption 
went out of the case with his testimony in reply. 65 The court of 
appeals held "the instruction ... should have been given. ,,66 Although 
the defendant gave sufficient evidence to present a jury question and 
thus avoid a directed verdict,67 the presumption did not disappear 
from the case. Judge Prescott formulated the rule for the court: 
In cases of this nature, after the plaintiff has offered proof of 
the ownership of the automobile in the defendant, if the 
defendant does not offer any evidence on the issue of agency, 
the Court should instruct the jury that if they find as a fact that 
the defendant owned the car, they must find he is responsible 
for the negligence (if any) of the driver. If the defendant does 
present evidence to show that the alleged driver was engaged on 
business or a purpose of his own, it may be so slight that the 
Court will rule it is insufficient to be considered by the jury in 
rebuttal of the presumption, in which case the Court should 
grant the same instruction it would have granted if the 
63. The plaintiff also sued the Baltimore Transit Company and its driver, but the judgments 
upon jury verdicts in favor of these defendants were not appealed. [d. at 251, 131 A.2d 
at 738. 
64. [d. at 252, 131 A.2d at 739. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. 
67. [d. at 255, 131 A.2d at 740. 
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defendant had offered no evidence on the issue. The evidence 
may be so conclusive that it shifts the burden or duty of going 
forward with evidence back to the plaintiff, in which event the 
defendant would be entitled to a directed verdict, if the 
plaintiff does not produce evidence in reply, unless there is 
already evidence in the case tending to contradict defendant's 
evidence .... The evidence, however, may fall between the two 
categories mentioned above, in which event the issue of agency 
should be submitted to the jury.68 
In terms of burden of proof, the court has said that a presumption 
shifts a special burden of going forward with the evidence: the party 
against whom the presumption operates must come forward with 
evidence to the contrary which is more than "slight" in the judgment of 
the trial judge.69 If he does not meet this burden, the presumed fact 
must prevail if the basic fact is found. But even if that special burden is 
met, the party relying on the presumption is yet entitled to an 
instruction relative to it, unless the usual burden of producing evidence 
on the issue of agency is rebounded to him by "conclusive" evidence. 
In mustering support for its decision"the court's rationale rang more 
of a defense of its anti-Thayerian tactics than the affirmative statement 
of policy which it was. Logically, Judge Prescott posed the question, "if 
the instruction be not granted, how is the jury to know of the 
presumption?,,70 The issue, however, is not "how" the jury should 
know of the presumption, but whether or not they should know of it, 
as a matter of jurisprudential policy. The court appeared to dabble in 
policy when it referred to the possible reluctance of the jury to find the 
owner liable if the presumption were not mentioned.71 The court may 
have been implying that because of a policy of broadening the 
responsibility of vehicle owners for harm caused by their instrumentali-
ties,72 the inference of agency arising from ownership73 needs a 
boost in the eyes of the jury. The court quoted extensively from 
McCormick, most notably his emphasis on the acceptance of the 
practice elsewhere, and his view that the presumption should be 
mentioned to impress upon the jury the law's attachment of special 
significance to the basic fact. 74 
68. 213 Md. at 254·55,131 A.2d at 740. To complete the rule, these words should be added 
at the end of the last sentence: "with an instruction as to the terms of the presumption." 
69. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a rule, that would apply in all 
cases, as to when the evidence is so slight that it is insufficient to be considered by 
the jury in rebuttal of the presumption of agency, or so conclusive as to require a 
directed verdict for the defendant. These matters must depend upon, and be 
decided by, the facts developed in each individual case. [d. at 255, 131 A.2d at 
740. 
70. [d. at 253, 131 A.2d at 739. 
71. [d. 
72. See p. 304 & note 21 supra. 
73. See p. 312 note 82 & p. 314 infra. 
74. 213 Md. at 253·54, 131 A.2d at 73940. 
1976] Presumptions 311 
Having made the threshold decision, in reliance on McCormick, to 
allow mention of the presumption despite the conflicting evidence, the 
court surely pondered the alternatives on instruction of the jury 
considered by him.7s Possibly, the court might have approved another 
form of instruction had the judges been concerned exclusively with 
boosting the presumption at trial. Let us assume, nevertheless, that the 
court of appeals, independently of the pressure of the instruction 
before it, faced the secondary question of what to say to the jury, that 
is, how to inject the presumption into the jury's deliberations. The 
Grier injection was not clean. The instruction which should have been 
given was that "if the jury found as a fact ownership of the car in the 
appellee, there arose a rebuttable presumption that the automobile was 
being operated by the appellee or by his agent. . . acting within the 
scope of the agent's... employment. ,,76 The court said nothing 
whatever with regard to whether or not, or how, the jury should be told 
to deal with the presumption. The jury cannot simply divine what a 
presumption is and how it should affect the case, and thus are left free 
to do with it what they will. An individual juror might regard it as 
conclusive; as evidence to be weighed; as meaning that the party against 
whom it operates must disprove it; or he might not regard it at all. Yet 
these are all possibilities which the court must have considered. In a 
sense, then, the form of instruction approved is potentially self-defeat-
ing and may have been opted for by elimination. A rebuttable 
presumption is not conclusive; it is not "evidence;" to the Grier court, 
it should not shift the burden of persuasion; but it should be considered 
by the jury in some manner. Perhaps the jurors would know that a 
"rebuttable" presumption cannot be "conclusive." Perhaps they would 
perceive that weighing a procedural rule in the balance does violence to 
classical notions of evidence. Perhaps they would understand from the 
charge in its entirety where the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion lies. But 
perhaps they would not, and their task is difficult enough without 
having to be performed in a mire of supposition. More than a statement 
of the terms of the presumption is needed. 77 
Grier was the first appellate reversal based on the giving or refusal to 
give an instruction on the effect of a presumption. The only prior 
"presumption cases,,78 involving directed verdicts were cases in which 
the party against whom the presumption operated offered conclusive or 
uncontradicted evidence in rebuttal. 79 One thing, however, is perfectly 
clear-Maryland has never embraced the Thayer dogma. Although 
before Grier dicta construable as Thayerian are to be found,80 the 
75. The court of appeals relied on McCormick's 1959 edition, but the material there is 
substantially the same as pp. 8·9 supra. 
76. 213 Md. at 252, 131 A.2d at 738·39. 
77. See the instruction in Phillips v. Cook, 239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (1965). 
78. Cases in which an aspect of presumption law was the ratio decidendi. 
79. See, e.g., Wagner v. Page, 179 Md. 465, 20 A.2d 164 (1941). 
80. See, e.g., Gordon v. Rawles, 201 Md. 503, 512·13, 94 A.2d 465, 470 (1953) (emphasis 
added): "Testimony in order to be legally sufficient to overthrow the presumption in 
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weight of the language falls heavily on the side of a stronger procedural 
effect, namely, imposition of a burden of proving the nonexistence of 
the presumed fact. Cases involving the presumption of the legitimacy of 
a child conceived or born during wedlock, the agency of the driver for 
the owner of a vehicle, and the invalidity of a gift between persons in a 
confidential relationship, indicate strongly that the person against 
whom the presumption is directed must respectively convince the trier 
of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is 
illegitimate,S 1 that the driver was not acting as a servant for the owner 
in the scope of employment,82 and that the gift was voluntarily 
given. 83 Regardless of the tendency, it is not possible to say that 
Maryland has followed a one-rule approach; rather, the cases indicate a 
presumption-by-presumption approach with an emphasis on according 
presumptions a greater procedural potency than the bursting bubble 
theory and many of its deviations. 
Whether Grier, then, was one step in a chronological progression 
toward giving presumptions a weightier significance or merely a 
gap-filler in established law, it was not a turning point. Nevertheless, 
Grier did, especially in conjunction with the cases which followed it, 
give more form and substance to a somewhat amorphous area of 
Maryland law. In view of the pre-Grier cases suggesting that presump-
tions, or certain presumptions, shift the burden of persuasion and the 
language used by the court of appeals in Grier to the effect that the 
presumption shifts only the burden of going forward with the 
evidence,84 the question naturally arises as to who should receive a 
verdict when the mind of the trier of fact is in equipoise, the party 
relying on the presumption or the party against whom the presumption 
operates. In Phillips v. Cook,85 a 1965 case involving personal injury to 
the plaintiff as the result of an automobile accident, the evidence was 
conflicting as to whether the driver of the car was acting in furtherance 
of partnership business so as to render his partner liable for his 
negligence, if any. After presenting the issue of agency to the jury and 
favor of a person's sanity and capacity ... must tend to show that he was incompetent at 
that particular time." Even if the language in Gordon on the presumption of sanity calls 
only for rebuttal evidence sufficient to support a finding of incompetence, a case decided 
shortly after Grier in 1957 is contradictory: "The presumption that a person is sane ... 
lasts until the contrary is established." Masius v. Wilson, 213 Md. 259, 268, 131 A.2d 
484, 488 (1957). 
81. See Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 320, 118 A.2d 366, 367 (1955); Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 
Md. 118, 134,31 A. 498, 501 (1895). This presumption may involve special problems of 
proof. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66F(b) (1957). 
82. See, e.g., Erdman v. Henry S. Horkheimer & Co., 169 Md. 204, 206-07, 181 A. 221·22 
(1935). Other cases indicate, however, that the inferential probative value of proof of 
ownership may be the key to getting to the jury. See, e.g., Fowser Fast Freight v. 
Simmont, 196 Md. 584, 588-89, 78 A.2d 178, 179-80 (1951). 
83. See, e.g., Tribull v. Tribull, 208 Md. 490, 507, 119 A.2d 399, 408 (1956); Farmer v. 
Associated Professors of Loyola College, 166 Md. 455,472,171 A. 361, 368 (1934); 
McGill v. Nichols, 157 Md. 287, 294, 145 A. 773, 776 (1929). 
84. Pp. 309-10 supra. 
85. 239 Md. 215, 210 A.2d 743 (1965). 
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infonning them that finn ownership of the car raises a presumption 
that it was being operated on firm business at the time of the accident, 
the lower court instructed: 
When I say it is a rebuttable presumption, what do I mean? ... 
[I]t becomes the duty of the defendant ... to go forward with 
the evidence to establish to your satisfaction by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence that the car was not at that time 
being operated on partnership business.86 
Despite the confused tenninology respecting burden of proof, there can 
be no doubt that this instruction cast the risk of nonpersuasion upon 
the defendant partner. The court of appeals found "no error in this 
regard. ,,8 7 
The first test of the Grier rule in the context of another presumption 
occurred in 1964 in a federal forum. Maryland v. Baltimore Transit 
Co. 88 was a diversity action brought for the death of plaintiff's 
decedent who was hit and killed by a bus of the defendant company. 
The evidence as to the decedent's due care was conflicting. The district 
court judge refused a requested instruction that the jury could consider 
the presumption of due care in the deceased's favor in reaching its 
verdict, and instructed the jury: "[W]here as here, evidence has been 
offered to show that the decedent failed to exercise ordinary care in a 
number of respects, you shall consider the proof which has been 
offered ... and you are not to rely on the presumption.,,89 The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Maryland law, reversed the 
judgments for the defendants and remanded. In the face of a strong 
dissent by Judge Haynesworth, who argued that Maryland would not 
apply the Grier fonnula to the presumption at issue and noted that 
Grier took Maryland "out of the main stream of the prevailing current 
of thought,,,90 the majority relied on Grier, applying its rule for the 
first time to another presumption-the presumption of due care. 
Judge Haynesworth proved wrong. In subsequent cases, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals applied Grier to the presumption of due care.91 The 
court stated in Bratton v. Smith :92 "While recognizing that Grier dealt 
with the presumption of agency, nevertheless its holding ... is apposite 
to the principle underpinning the use of presumptions. ,,93 One 
question which Grier left open has been answered-the rule there 
announced has application to at least one other presumption. 
86. ld. at 222, 210 A.2d at 748. 
87.ld. 
88. 329 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964). 
89. ld. at 739. 
90. ld. at 745. 
91. E.g., Gresham v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 256 Md. 500, 260 A.2d 649 (1970); 
Bratton v. Smith, 256 Md. 695, 261 A.2d 777 (1970). 
92. 256 Md. 695, 261 A.2d 777 (1970). 
93. ld. at 702·03, 261 A.2d at 781. 
314 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 5 
The court of appeals has neither prognosticated nor suggested in the 
cases applying Grier how far its rule will be extended.94 The 
presumption of agency for which the rule was originally fashioned may 
be said to be founded upon both the public policy of enlarging the 
sphere of responsibility of owners for their vehicles and the circum-
stantial value of the fact of ownership.95 The presumption of due care 
cannot claim this double distinction, for the fact of death does not 
suggest that the decedent was exercising the prudence of a reasonable 
man when he met his fate. Although it is often said that the 
presumption issues from the instinct of survival,96 it is probably more 
akin to giving the benefit of the doubt to one who cannot speak for 
himself, which is a matter of the policy of the law. The common 
denominator of public policy is certainly an indicator, but it is not a 
mechanistic formula. The court of appeals will undoubtedly decide on a 
presumption-by-presumption basis which ones merit the Grier effect. 
All presumptions founded on some public policy should not be 
accorded that effect, nor should all presumptions not primarily based 
on public policy be denied it. Consider, for example, the presumption 
of death from absence for seven years or more. The policy of 
preventing property rights from being held in abeyance97 is, in some 
measure, counterbalanced by the drastic nature of declaring someone 
dead. Even non-conclusive evidence that the person is not dead, or that 
he has not been seen or heard from for some reason should remove the 
presumption altogether, and require direct evidence to support the 
finding. The Maryland legislature implied as much and more when it 
abolished this common law presumption in these terms: 
If the death of a person or the date of his death is at issue, he 
is not presumed dead. . . merely because he has been absent 
from his place of residence and not heard about for any stated 
period of time. The issue shall go to the court as one of fact to 
be determined upon the evidence .... 98 
Even if the legislature had not abrogated the presumption, the same 
rationale by the judiciary might well have exluded it from the embrace 
of the Grier rule. 
A presumption arising solely as a matter of inference, on the other 
hand, such as that of receipt from proof of proper mailing, might well 
deserve the Grier procedural effect by probability alone. But the 
problem here is more in name than substance. "[O]ne may slip from 
presumption to inference and back again too quickly for the eye, ear, 
94. In Grier, the court prefaced its general formulation, pp. 309·10 supra, with the words "in 
cases of this nature." 213 Md. at 254,131 A.2d at 740. 
95. See p. 312 note 82 & p. 310 supra. 
96. See, e.g., Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 194 Md. 421, 434,71 A.2d 442, 447(1950). 
97. P. 304 supra. 
98. MD. ANN. CODE, Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-102 (1974). 
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or mind to detect.... [A]fter rebuttal of the presumption the 
inference remains and may be treated as doing the same work as the 
presumption even though the presumption is gone.'>99 
What the court of appeals has wrought by Grier and its progeny is a 
judgment that the values underlying presumptions, or at least some 
presumptions, are not adequately supported by the law which banishes 
them upon the appearance of non-conclusive contradictory evidence. 
To the extent that the burden of persuasion is moved, even tempo-
rarily, this judgment rests by necessity upon a determination, though 
sub silentio, that the policies dictating the original allocation of burden 
of proof in the action have been countermanded. loo In effect, the Grier 
rule has struck a balance between the bursting bubble extreme and that 
called for by Morgan and McCormicklol -a final shifting of the burden 
of persuasion. The boundaries of the Grier holding, however, have yet 
to be drawn. The door is open to the Maryland attorney who relies 
upon a presumption not yet assigned this effect, to persuade the court 
that, in view of the nature of the presumption, the probative value of 
the basic facts, the underlying policies, and, more specifically, the Grier 
rationale,102 the presumption depended upon deserves such signifi-
cance. 
FEDERAL RULE 301 
To promote uniformity in federal court practice, in February, 1973, 
the Chief Justice of the United States reported to Congress proposed 
rules of evidence for use in federal courts and before federal 
magistrates. 103 As submitted by the Supreme COurt,104 Rule 301, 
governing the effect of presumptions in cases controlled by federal law, 
read: 
In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by 
these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it 
is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the 
presumed fact is more probable than its existence. lOS 
99. Gausewitz, Presumptions, 40 MINN. L. REV. 391,401 (1956). 
100. MCCORMICK 826. For a discussion of the policies involved in the original allocation of 
burden of proof, see id. § 337. 
101. P. 307 supra. 
102. Pp. 310 supra. 
103. The rules were recommended by an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, and 
subsequently approved by the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and by the Judicial Conference of the United States. 
104. The Supreme Court promulgated three rules dealing with presumptions: Rule 301, 
governing the effect to be given presumptions generally; Rule 302, prescribing when state 
law as to the effect of presumptions was to be applied; and Rule 303, excepting from the 
general rule presumptions operating against an accused in a criminal case. 41 U.S.L.W. 
4023 (Nov. 21, 1972). Rule 303 was deleted by the Congress. See note 3 supra. 
105. 41 U.S.L.W. 4023 (Nov. 21, 1972). Rule 302 "otherwise provides" for the applicability 
of state law in certain cases. Pp. 318·21 infra. 
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The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 301 explained simply that the 
proposed rule shifting the risk of nonpersuasion was based upon a 
determination that, in view of the policy considerations underlying the 
creation of presumptions, the bursting bubble theory gave presump-
tions "too 'slight and evanescent' an effect. "106 The Advisory Com-
mittee, however, gave no indication whatsoever as to whether, in its 
view, the proposed rule worked a change in existing federal law or was 
simply a continuance of the manner in which federal courts were then 
treating presumptions. The reason may be that the federal treatment of 
presumptions was in a state of disarray.'07 At the time the Supreme 
Court's proposed rule was under consideration, it was said both that it 
rejected the prevailing view of the federal courts lOtl and that it was 
"nothing more than a summary of existing law as to the treatment to 
be given to presumptions by the Federal CourtS."109 Nevertheless, the 
Court's rule did not survive long, Congress working its will initially 
through the House of Representatives. I JO Rule 301 as amended and 
passed by the House provided: 
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for 
by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on 
the party against whom it is directed the burden of going 
forward with the evidence, and, even though met with 
contradicting evidence, a presumption is sufficient evidence of 
the fact presumed, to be considered by the trier of the fact. III 
The House Judiciary Committee, which adopted this "intermediate 
position,""2 concurred in the Supreme Court's criticism of the 
106. 46 F.R.D. 215, quoting from Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at 
Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 913 (1937). 
107. Compare, e.g., Psaty v. U.S., 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1971) and United Aniline Co. 
v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701, 704 (1st Cir. 1963) with, e.g., Stout v. Commissioner, 
273 F.2d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 1959) and Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195, 199 
(9th Cir. 1959). In 1938, the Supreme Court said, with respect to the presumption 
against suicide, or in favor of accidental death: 
The evidence being sufficient to sustain a finding that the death was not due to 
accident ... the case stood for decision by the jury upon the evidence unaffected 
by the rule that from the fact of violent death, there being nothing to show the 
contrary, accidental death will be presumed. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 
303 U.S. 161, 171 (1938). 
108. Fornoff, Presumptions-The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 ARK. L. REV. 401, 
408 (1971). 
109. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of 
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 
ser. 2, at 221 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings J. 
110. Under the "Rules Enabling Acts," 18 U.S.C. 3402, 3771,3772 (1970); 28 U.S.C. 2072, 
2075 (1970), the Supreme Court's rules would have taken effect ninety days after they 
were reported to Congress by the Chief Justice without action by Congress. Because of 
the significance of the rules and, as some contended under enabling acts, the substantive 
nature of some of the proposals, the Congress delayed the effective date of the rules until 
Congress had an opportunity to enact them affirmatively. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. 
L. No. 93·12, 87 Stat. 9. 
111. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
112. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). 
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bursting bubble doctrine, but thought that a shift of the burden of 
persuasion was too great an effect to accord pre sum ptions. 113 
The Senate Judiciary Committee disagreed: 
The committee feels the House amendment is ill-advised. As 
the joint committees (the Standing Committee on Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference and the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Rules of Evidence) stated: "Presumptions are not 
evidence, but ways of dealing with evidence." This treatment 
requires juries to perform the task of considering "as evidence" 
facts upon which they have no direct evidence and which may 
confuse them in performance of their duties. I 14 
When the Senate completed its revision of Rule 301, the gamut had 
been run-the Supreme Court's shift in the risk of non-persuasion was 
permanently left behind, the House presumption-as-evidence rule had 
been rejected, and the final step back to the bursting bubble theory was 
taken. The Senate version was adopted by the Conference Committee 
of both houses,\1S and Rule 301 enacted by the Congress\16 and 
incorporated in the Federal Rules of Evidence now provides: 
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for 
by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on 
the party against whom it is directed the burden of going 
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but 
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of 
the risk of non persuasion, which remains throughout the trial 
upon the party on whom it was originally cast. I 17 
In terms, this formulation is a bursting bubble rule. I II! The explication 
of the operation of the rule given by the Committee of Conference, 
however, exhibits either a fundamental misunderstanding of the theory 
or an intent to modify it: 
Under [the rule], a presumption is sufficient to get a party 
past an adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the end of his 
case-in-chief. If the adverse party offers no evidence contradict-
ing the presumed fact, the court will instruct the jury that if it 
finds the basic facts, it may presume the existence of the 
presumed fact. If the adverse party does offer evidence 
contradicting the presumed fact, the court cannot instruct the 
jury that it may presume the existence of the presumed fact 
113. Id. 
114. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) (footnotes omitted). 
115. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974). 
116. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93·595, 88 Stat._(1975). 
117. Rule 30l. 
118. See pp. 305·06 & notes 32·35 supra. 
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from proof of the basic facts. The court may, however, instruct 
the jury that it may infer the existence of the presumed fact 
from proof of the basic facts. 119 
The Committee's implication that a presumption will not necessarily 
prevail in the absence of contradictory evidence is contrary to the most 
basic tenent of presumption law. 120 Either the Committee's choice of 
words is inexact or the federal courts will simply not abide by the 
language, for when a party fails to sustain his burden of producing 
evidence, the presumed fact controls. It is clear, however, that once 
evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding of the nonex-
istence of the presumed fact,121 the presumption is gone, and must not 
be mentioned to the jury, although the inference may remain in the 
case of basic facts which are circumstantially probative. 122 
FEDERAL RULE 302 
The conflict between the bursting bubble theory of Rule 301 and the 
greater procedural effect accorded presumptions under Maryland law 
poses this immediate question: When will Maryland law govern the 
effect of presumptions in federal court cases, and when will Rule 301 
control? The answer is a function of the Erie doctrine123 as formulated 
with respect to presumptions124 by the Supreme Court in Federal 
Rule 302: 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption 
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to 
which State law supplies the rule of decision is determined in 
accordance with State law. 125 
119. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5·6 (1974). 
120. P. 303 & note 13 infra; 29 AM. JUR. 2d, Evidence § 165 at 200 (1967). 
121. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 301 [02], at 301·28 (1975). 
122. See p. 314-15 supra. While the proscription against mentioning the word "presumption" 
is sound Thayer doctrine, p. 306 & note 36 supra, the distinction between using the 
word "presume" and the word "infer" appears superficial. McCormick points out that 
the word "presume" may make an inordinately strong impression upon the jury. 
MCCORMICK 825. Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger state that a reversal will not 
necessarily follow from mention of the "dreaded word." WEINSTEIN & BERGER,SUpra note 
121, at 301-28: "It is unlikely that it will be understood by the jury in its technical sense 
rather than as a synonym for inference." 
123. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As most commonly formulated, the doctrine 
commands the application of the substantive law of the forum state by federal courts 
exercising diversity jurisdiction. For a more refined analysis in the light of subsequent 
cases, see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 55-60 (2d ed. 1970). More accurately, 
state substantive law applies if the issue presented to the court arises out of state-created 
rights, regardless of the ground of jurisdiction. Id. at 226; K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 56 (1975). 
124. Advisory Committee Note, 46 F.R.D. 211. 
125. Rule 302 as submitted by the Supreme Court was enacted by the Congress without 
substantial change. 
1976J Presumptions 319 
Before the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence the Erie 
doctrine seemed to have comprehended state presumption law in toto, 
for the federal courts in diversity cases routinely applied state law on 
the effect of presumptions. 126 In 1959, the Supreme Court itself 
applied North Dakota law on the effect of the presumption of 
accidental death, or against suicide, arising from proof of violent death. 
The plaintiff in Dick u. New York Life Ins. CO. 127 was the beneficiary 
of two insurance policies issued by the defendant on the life of the 
plaintiff's husband. The defendant had rejected the plaintiff's claims 
under clauses providing for double indemnity in the event of accidental 
death but excluding double indemnity in the event of suicide. The 
defendant contended that the insured had taken his own life. At the 
close of the evidence, the district court judge denied the insurer's 
motion for a directed verdict and instructed the jury, in accordance 
with North Dakota law, that accidental death is presumed and that the 
insurer has the burden of persuasion. The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed/ 28 holding that, on the evidence, the issue should not 
have been submitted to the jury and that the defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict should have been granted. 129 The Supreme Court held 
this to be error. 130 Under North Dakota law, a presumption not only 
shifts the burden of persuasion but is considered as affirmative evidence 
to be weighed. Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion concluded that 
the evidence presented by the plaintiff, together with the presumption, 
was sufficient proof of accidental death to present a jury question. 
Although the Supreme Court did no more than apply state law in 
finding that the court of appeals weighed the evidence improperly, 
Chief Justice Warren's opinion broadly declared: "Under the Erie rule, 
presumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are 'substan-
tive' .... "131 With the enactment of Rule 302, the question has been 
raised whether the Erie doctrine and presumptions will maintain this 
relationship. 
Rule 302 declares that state law will control "the effect of a 
presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense 
as to which state law supplies the rule of decision. 132 State law supplies 
the rule of decision as to claims and defenses having their origin in state 
law, or, more generally, in diversity cases. 133 It is the language 
"respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense" which 
126. E.g., Castilleja v. Southern Pacific Co., 406 F.2d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 1969) (applying 
Texas law); Maryland v. Baltimore Transit Co., 329 F.2d 738 (4th Cir." 1964) (applying 
Maryland law). See also 5 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE. ~ 43.08 at 
43-89 to 43-90 (2d ed. 1975). 
127. 359 U.S. 437 (1959). The plaintiff initially brought suit in North Dakota state court, but 
the defendant removed the case to federal district court on diversity grounds. [d. at 438. 
128. Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 252 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1958). 
129. [d. at 47. 
130. 359 U.S. at 445. 
131. [d. at 446 (footnote omitted). 
132. Rule 302. 
133. See p. 318 & note 123 supra. 
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must be scrutinized. Although on its face, this language might seem to 
be no more than a codification of the Warren Court's assertion in Dick 
that, for Erie purposes, presumptions are substantive, thus mandating 
the application of state law, the Rule has affixed a qualification: the 
presumed fact must be SUbstantively material to the' complainant's 
recovery or the defendant's avoidance of liability. 134 According to the 
Advisory Committee, this scope of the Erie doctrine in the field of 
presumptions was the product of three Supreme Court cases, Dick and 
two earlier cases involving original allocations of burden of proof. In 
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlop,135 the plaintiff sued to quiet title to 
land, claiming status as a bona fide purchaser. The Supreme Court held 
that the lower courts erred in failing to apply the Texas rule that the 
burden was on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was not a bona 
fide purchaser. Palmer v. Hoffman l36 similarly involved state law 
regarding burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence. 
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger believe that Rule 302 evidences a 
policy favoring the application of federal law over state law "in cases of 
doubt" because "the draftsmen of the Rule deliberately chose to 
interpret the Erie doctrine as narrowly as possible.,,137 Were this true, 
the rule would have required as a prerequisite to the applicability of 
state presumption law that the existence of the presumed fact must 
tend to establish or disprove the claim or defense itself, rather than an 
"element" of the claim or defense. It is probably more accurate to say 
that Rule 302 embodies the Burger Court's more refined view of the 
appropriate scope of the Erie doctrine as it applies to presumptions, 
without ascribing any underlying functional policy. 
It is clear, nevertheless, that Rule 302 contemplates instances in 
diversity cases in which state law will not control the effect of 
presumptions. The Advisory Committee Note refers to these instances 
as "tactical presumptions" without further explanation.13/1 The term is 
misleading in that it implies that particular presumptions may never be 
governed by state law, regardless of their significance in the case. 
Indeed, Weinstein and Berger were misled into citing as an example of a 
tactical presumption, the presumption of receipt arising from proof of 
proper mailing. 139 First, the federal courts have regularly followed state 
law concerning the effect of this presumption.140 Second, the receipt 
of mailed matter is often an element of a claim or defense, for example, 
in a suit for breach of warranty in regard to accepted goods where the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant was given reasonable notice of 
134. The Advisory Committee Note on Rule 302 states that the presumption must operate 
upon a substantive element of the claim or defense. 46 F.R.D. 211. See also WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 121, at 302·05. 
135. 308 U.S. 208 (1939). 
136. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
137. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 121, at 302-05. 
138. 46 F.R.D. 211. 
139. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 121, at 302·04. 
140. E.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Summers, 403 F.2d 971, 975 (1st Cir. 1968). 
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the breach. 141 It is not the nature or ongm of the particular 
presumption which determines the applicability of state law, but the 
materiality of the presumed fact in the case. 
Although the Rule allows for a rather nebulous zone in which 
non-material presumptions may not be governed by state law and 
although the Burger Court's formulation of Rule 302 is, in terms, either 
less broad or more precise than the Warren Court's statement in Dick, 
Rule 302 will not measurably whittle down the applicability of state 
law in appropriate federal cases. Certainly the Congress did not 
contemplate such a result. While Rule 301, which originally proposed a 
drastic departure from the bursting bubble theory, 142 was much 
debated and amended,143 Rule 302 was not even debated. In enacting 
Rule 302, the Congress undoubtedly viewed it as a maintenance of the 
status quo. In addition, the foothold which state presumption law has 
established in federal courts and the latitude available to federal judges 
in originally determining the scope of Rule 302 militate against any 
significant excision of state presumption law from the Erie doctrine. 
Thus, the major task and opportunity of the advocate relying on a 
presumption in a federal court applying Maryland substantive law will 
not be to convince the court that state law should control the effect of 
the presumption, but to persuade the court, as he must in a Maryland 
forum 144 and as the plaintiff did in Maryland v. Baltimore Transit 
CO.,145 that the law of Maryland would accord the presumption a 
particular procedural effect. 
J. Clinton Kelly 
141. See MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-607(3)(a) (1975). 
142. P. 315 supra. 
143. Pp. 315-17 supra. 
144. P. 315 supra. 
145. 329 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964). See p. 313 supra. 
